


Lessons learnt from 20 years of revenue sharing at Bwindi Impenetrable National Park, Uganda

Phil Franks and Medard Twinamatsiko



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Institute of Tropical Forest Conservation, Uganda

The Institute of Tropical Forest Conservation (ITFC) is a semi-autonomous postgraduate research institute of Mbarara University of Science and Technology (MUST). Established in 1991, and based at Ruhija in Bwindi Impenetrable National Park, southwest Uganda, its core mandate is to conduct research, monitoring and training for conservation management in and around the Albertine Rift protected areas.

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Summary

Bwindi Impenetrable National Park is one of the prime protected areas in Uganda, famous for its mountain gorilla families that have been habituated to allow gorilla-tracking safaris. A revenue sharing (RS) scheme was established in 1995 through which 20 per cent of the park's revenue was shared with park-adjacent communities. The objective of revenue sharing is to provide local communities with an incentive to support conservation, particularly when they might be adversely impacted for example through having their crops raided by wild animals. Revenue tends to be distributed as grants for projects. Uganda Wildlife Authority has national revenue-sharing guidelines applicable to all its parks and, building on these guidelines, is currently developing a formal revenue-sharing regulation.

During 2016 a learning evaluation based on 20 years of revenue sharing was carried out among communities surrounding Bwindi, with a view to strengthening the implementation of the revenue sharing and enabling it to become more effective and more equitable. The findings would also help inform the ongoing process of developing a national revenue-sharing regulation. In addition, it was intended for the research to have global value, influencing conservation-related revenue-sharing policy and practice at other sites of great ape conservation within Africa and beyond.

Although protected areas across the world are now far more likely to consider social and economic conditions in their surrounding communities alongside their biodiversity targets, many issues of equity and effectiveness in revenue sharing are still a long way from being resolved. As this study illustrates, there may be a number of different pathways through which a revenue-sharing scheme might deliver national/global conservation impact and local social impacts, but none of these can be taken for granted. An equity framework based on the three dimensions of recognition, procedure and distribution provides an opportunity for identifying improvements in revenue-sharing policy and practice.

To explore revenue-sharing lessons in detail, the Bwindi study established nine learning questions that covered: funding flows; beneficiary targeting/boundary issues; monitoring and reporting; governance structures; project type; project selection processes; understanding of equity; the trade-offs between equity and effectiveness; and the pathways to conservation impact. The research used quantitative and qualitative methods, sampling 520 respondents in 27 park-adjacent parishes and 30 key informants from government and non-government agencies. Focus group discussions and a stakeholder workshop provided additional valuable insights. A theory of change has been developed which proposes six different pathways by which a revenue-sharing scheme,

governed in line with the current Uganda revenue-sharing guidelines, might deliver conservation impact.

The research results provide extensive details on the pitfalls in a revenue-sharing process, but also demonstrate how revenue sharing at Bwindi has played an important role in improving the relationship between people and park that had been severely damaged by the creation of the park in 1991. Despite considerable differences of opinion, discussions led to broad consensus in a number of areas on measures to enhance the equity and effectiveness of revenue sharing at Bwindi, including project selection. The research also identified a valuable set of measures to strengthen national revenue-sharing policy.

Findings from the research have been translated into pointers for improving practice at the park level, and have been shared with officials developing the new national revenue-sharing regulations. This research report focuses on wider application of the learning beyond Bwindi Impenetrable National Park. The study at Bwindi has generated examples of equity issues in each of its three key dimensions: recognition, procedure and distribution. Given that the discourse around revenue sharing (and benefit sharing more generally) tends to focus on who gets what benefit, it was notable that issues of recognition and procedure were raised as important equity issues without prompting.

The discussion here on the nine learning questions provides considerable food for thought, and a set of six broad recommendations:

1. **Streamline management and governance systems** to reduce transaction costs and strengthen accountability while ensuring governance reflects the specific goals and principles of revenue sharing.
2. **Clarify the relative weighting given to human-wildlife conflict versus human wellbeing.** This needs to be done in the national policy in terms of key principles, but the actual weighting could vary from one protected area to another.
3. **Increase accountability of the revenue-sharing scheme to key actors** that have strongest interest in its effective implementation, in this case Uganda Wildlife Authority and protected area-adjacent communities.
4. **Strengthen monitoring and reporting** on how decisions are made, the level of funding and its flow through the system, and how key actors perform their responsibilities.
5. **Maximise the value of benefits and cost reduction in terms of human wellbeing.** The key parameter is not the financial value of a revenue-sharing intervention but its contribution to wellbeing.
6. **Strengthen the influence of the target communities,** and key social groups within them, on the selection of projects and beneficiaries through change in governance structures and processes.


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National park revenue sharing in Uganda

The focus of this study is Bwindi Impenetrable National Park (BINP) in southwest Uganda (see Figure 1). BINP is one of the prime protected areas (PA)¹ in Uganda, famous for its mountain gorillas some of which have been habituated to allow gorilla tracking safaris. In BINP a revenue-sharing scheme was established in 1995 through which 20 per cent of all of the PA's revenue was allocated for sharing with PA-adjacent communities, subsequently supplemented by a US\$5 levy on each gorilla trekking permit. Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA) now has a national RS policy applicable to all parks, but issues of inequity mean that those receiving the benefits aren't those suffering the greatest costs of conservation. This learning evaluation conducted in 2016 draws together lessons from 20 years of RS at BINP in order to strengthen its implementation at Bwindi, provide guidance that can inform Uganda's national revenue-sharing guidelines, and influence the policy and practice of RS in other countries.

¹ Protected areas can take many different forms, such as national parks, wilderness areas, community conserved areas, nature reserves and privately owned reserves. The term Protected Area (PA) in this study refers to Bwindi Impenetrable National Park and other similar areas with national park status.

Figure 1: Map showing Bwindi Impenetrable National Park in Uganda (Source: ITFC)



Key concepts

Revenue sharing and benefit sharing

In the context of this study, revenue sharing (RS) is concerned with the arrangements for sharing a proportion of the PA's income with local stakeholders to provide an incentive for them to support conservation. Usually the focus is specifically on communities – indigenous and non-indigenous – that live within and around the PA. Revenue is usually understood to be gross income rather than net income after deduction of costs (ie profit). The revenue shared may be in the form of cash payments, but is more usually disbursed in the form of small grants for projects. These may be projects for individual community members (eg micro-enterprises, school bursaries) or group projects that benefit part or all of the community (eg support for school infrastructure, road repair).

In cases where payments/grants are explicitly made on condition there is a specific positive contribution by the community to PA conservation, this is enforced through

performance based monitoring, and the revenue sharing can be considered a form of payment for ecosystem services (PES). But this is not common – in most cases PA revenue-sharing schemes deliver payments/grants to communities as a goodwill gesture with no explicit conditionality, and in Uganda this right is enshrined in policy and law. In all instances the investment by a PA in revenue sharing is expected to deliver not just a contribution to the livelihoods/wellbeing of local people (social impact) but also a positive conservation impact that has value at national and global levels. As this study will illustrate, there may be a number of different pathways through which a revenue-sharing scheme might deliver national/global conservation impact and local social impacts, none of which can be taken for granted.

Revenue sharing can also be regarded as a specific example of the broader notion of benefit sharing, which relates to any kind of benefit from a PA that can be selectively allocated by the managers of the scheme. In Bwindi Impenetrable National Park benefit sharing also includes having access for harvesting specific resources within the PA, access to cultural sites, and support for development projects from a conservation trust fund – the Bwindi and Mgahinga Conservation Trust (BMCT).

Effectiveness and equity

The definition of effectiveness used by the OECD Development Assistance Committee 'Criteria for evaluating development assistance', is: *a measure of the extent to which an aid activity attains its objectives* (OECD 2000). Accordingly, it is possible to define 'effective conservation' as conservation that delivers on its agreed objectives. Conservation has moved quite a long way in the last 50 years towards adopting a more pluralistic framing of conservation objectives, for example, by embracing the objectives of communities living within and around conservation areas alongside national and global conservation objectives; and embracing social, cultural and economic objectives alongside biodiversity conservation *per se*.

In the context of PAs, the term 'effectiveness' is most commonly used in conjunction with management (management effectiveness) and refers to:


1. Design issues relating to both individual sites and protected area systems
2. Adequacy and appropriateness of management systems and processes, and
3. Delivery of protected area objectives including conservation of values.

Thus, a PA management effectiveness evaluation extends the notion of effectiveness to also cover design issues, and the systems and processes that support implementation (Leverington *et al.* 2010).

Whilst the meaning of effectiveness in relation to PAs is now generally well understood, the same cannot be said for equity. Since the inclusion of a target to achieve equitable management of PAs in the Aichi Targets of the CBD Strategic Plan² there has been concern over what this actually means and how to measure progress. In response, IIED is leading an international initiative to unpack the meaning of the term equity in relation to the conservation of PA's (Schreckenberg *et al.* 2016), building on earlier work on understanding equity in the context of PES (McDermott *et al.* 2013; Pascual *et al.* 2014).

A first level of unpacking reveals three equally important dimensions – recognition, procedure and distribution (see Figure 2). Within each dimension 4–6 key issues have been identified which can be expressed as principles (Schreckenberg *et al.* 2016) – see Figure 3. Whereas equity has often been considered as mainly an issue of the distribution of costs and benefits, this equity framework – supported by a growing body of evidence (Martin *et al.* 2014) – makes it clear that procedure and recognition of rights are not only important in shaping the actual distribution of costs and benefits but are also fundamental dimensions of the notion of equity in their own right. These principles of procedure and recognition are essentially the principles of good governance.

Figure 2: The three dimensions of equity embedded within a set of enabling conditions



Source: Adapted from McDermott *et al.* (2013) and Pascual *et al.* (2014)

² www.cbd.int/sp/targets/rationale/target-11/

Figure 3: The principles that underlie the three dimensions of equity

RECOGNITION

1. Recognitionⁱ and respectⁱⁱ for human rights
2. Recognition and respect for statutoryⁱⁱⁱ and customary property rights^{iv}
3. Recognition and respect for the rights of indigenous peoples, women and marginalised groups
4. Recognition of different identities, values, knowledge systems and institutions
5. Recognition of all relevant actors^v and their diverse interests, capacities and powers to influence
6. Non-discrimination by age, ethnic origin, language, gender, class and beliefs

PROCEDURE

7. Full and effective^{vi} participation of all relevant actors in decision making
8. Clearly defined and agreed responsibilities of actors
9. Accountability^{vii} for actions and inactions
10. Access to justice, including an effective dispute-resolution process
11. Transparency^{viii} supported by timely access to relevant information in appropriate forms
12. Free, prior and informed consent^{ix} for actions that may affect the property rights of Indigenous peoples and local communities

DISTRIBUTION

13. Identification and assessment of costs, benefits^x and risks and their distribution^{xi} and trade-offs^{xii}
14. Effective mitigation^{xiii} of any costs to Indigenous peoples and local communities
15. Benefits shared among relevant actors according to one or more^{xiv} of the following criteria:
 - equally between relevant actors or
 - according to contribution to conservation, costs incurred, recognised rights and/or the priorities of the poorest
16. Benefits to present generations do not compromise benefits to future generations

Source: Reproduced from Schreckenber *et al.* (2016)

Notes: i) Recognition means acknowledging, and accepting the legitimacy of, a particular issue, right or interest, etc. ii) Respect means not interfering with the enjoyment of the right. iii) Recognized within the country's legal framework. iv) In a protected area context, resource rights include rights to own or use resources. v) Relevant actors include rights-holders and stakeholders. These are organizations (including the protected area authority itself), groups and individuals with interests in, statutory or customary rights or influence over the protected area and its resources. vi) 'Full and effective participation' means meaningful influence throughout a decision-making process. vii) Accountability incorporates social, political and financial accountability. viii) Transparency relates particularly to decision-making processes, responsibilities and actions, and financial flows. ix) Free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) is a process through which rights-holders are empowered to determine whether an activity that will affect their rights may proceed by giving, or having the right to withhold, their consent. x) The terms 'costs' and 'benefits' are used in the broadest sense to include all types of impacts on human wellbeing, whether or not they have monetary value. xi) Distribution includes: a) spatial – between actors at site level and also between site and other levels, and b) intergenerational – between youths and adults. xii) 'Trade-off' in this context refers to a situation in which decisions over the distribution of benefits and costs involve compromises between two competing objectives. xiii) Possible mitigation strategies include avoidance, minimization, compensation (cash or in-kind, or support for alternative sources of livelihood), voluntary relocation and restitution, decided through an effective FPIC process. xiv) In many cases, benefit-sharing strategies apply a combination of these criteria. xv) As determined by principle 2. xvi) Protected area governance types identified by IUCN – government, Indigenous peoples and local communities, private, and shared.

In summary, equity is a condition that defines how PA conservation, and in the context of this study PA-based revenue sharing, should be practiced; and effectiveness is about both the long-term goal and shorter-term objectives, and the targets that will be achieved along the way. Since the objectives, targets and context change over time there is also no equitable and effective 'end state', that is, we use the terms in the sense of achieving more equitable and more effective conservation (Schreckenberg *et al.* 2016). Furthermore, equity and effectiveness are very clearly interrelated both in terms of the contribution that more equitable conservation makes to improving effectiveness and vice versa. This concept is taken up further in the discussion section of this report (Section 4).

Revenue-sharing policy in Uganda's national parks

According to the most recent guidelines (UWA 2012), the overall goal of revenue sharing is *"to ensure strong partnership between protected area management, local communities and local governments, leading to sustainable management of resources in and around protected areas by enabling people living adjacent to protected areas to obtain financial benefits derived from the existence of these areas that contribute to improvements in their welfare and help gain their support for protected areas conservation"*.

The Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA) guidelines also define the following specific objectives for revenue sharing:

- a) To provide an enabling environment for establishing good relations between the protected areas and their neighbouring local communities
- b) To demonstrate the economic value of protected areas and conservation in general to communities neighbouring protected areas, and
- c) To strengthen the support and acceptance for protected areas and conservation activities from communities living adjacent to these areas (UWA 2012).

Since the year 2000, 20 per cent of national park entrance fees paid by tourists to Uganda have been shared with communities in the parishes (administration areas within districts) bordering the PAs. The national park entry fee for the premier parks (the six category 'A' national parks) is currently US\$40 per day. The 20 per cent share is allocated across the PA-adjacent parishes according to a formula, with the allocation depending on two variables: the proportion of the total PA boundary that is covered by the parish and the proportion of the total population of the PA-adjacent parishes that are resident in that parish. Local government retains 5 per cent of this total revenue-sharing funding and allocates 95 per cent to projects that have been selected for funding (UWA 2012).

In the particular case of BINP, the 20 per cent of national park entry fees is also supplemented by a small levy of US\$5 on each gorilla tracking permit. (This has recently increased to US\$10 but the funds from 2015, based on US\$5, are still yet to be disbursed). The number of tourists tracking gorillas in a year varies between 15–20,000 and thus the total revenue to be shared varies between US\$195,000 and US\$260,000. With the recent increase in the gorilla levy to US\$10 this budget will increase to between US\$270,000–US\$360,000. There are around 35,000 men, women and children in the ‘front-line’ villages so the average per person amount would be approximately US\$10/year if the funding reached the intended beneficiaries without losses along the way. These funds are allocated to support projects rather than, as in much of southern Africa, cash handouts partly on the assumption that projects enable the social impact of revenue sharing to be considerably amplified.

In Uganda's national parks the annual funding cycle for the process of identifying and selecting revenue-sharing projects (see Figure 4a) begins in July, with village members (LC1) meeting to identify the projects they would like to submit for funding. At the next level up (parish, or LC2) the Parish Development Committee (PDC) prioritises the projects they have received from the different LC1s in their parish. This prioritised list is then forwarded to the lowest level of local government (sub-county) where the projects that will be funded are selected. The selection is made by a committee of government officials from parish, sub-county and district levels. The current revenue-sharing guidelines specify two criteria for prioritisation and selection (UWA 2012):

- The extent to which the identified projects address human-wildlife conflict as well as human welfare in an efficient and cost-effective manner, and
- A fair spatial and temporal distribution of RS fund beneficiaries among frontline LC1s.


In short, projects selected should be targeted for PA-adjacent villages and should not only improve human wellbeing but should also reduce human-wildlife conflict (HWC). There are serious problems of HWC in most villages that border Uganda's national parks.

Once project selection has been made, the process of drawing down the funds from UWA begins. Currently there are major delays in this process as UWA cannot start disbursing funds for a new cycle without finalising the accounts for the previous cycle, and there are often major delays in local governments submitting accounts (Figure 4b shows the reporting hierarchy). At the time of writing funding for the 2015 cycle is yet to be disbursed. As with project prioritisation and selection, the funds go through the local government system, starting with UWA disbursing to the districts and then districts to sub-counties.

Prior to the establishment of a national revenue-sharing policy, revenue-sharing schemes were established in just a few of Uganda's PAs and each PA had a different arrangement. In BINP the revenue-sharing scheme was established in 1995, through which 20 per cent of all of the PA's revenue was allocated to sharing with PA-adjacent communities. While the total amount of funding was comparable to the current model, the process of project selection and funds transfer from UWA to the projects to be funded was much simpler. The scheme focused only on community projects at parish level, projects were prioritised by an ad hoc committee at parish level, and then forwarded to an ad hoc committee – the Community Park Institution (CPI) – at PA level for selection. Funds were then disbursed to the parish in the form of a cheque from UWA to the parish bank account. The current more complex and costly approach was introduced because of the Local Government Act of 1997, which required that all government money, including money from parastatals such as UWA, pass through the local government system.

A recent study of revenue sharing in Uganda concludes that the revenue-sharing scheme of BINP in its current form is improving livelihoods, and there is some evidence of a positive conservation impact, but the scheme as a whole 'is hampered by corruption and inequity leading to worsening economic inequality and resentment'. The inequity relates particularly to the fact that those receiving the benefits of revenue sharing are rarely those suffering the greatest costs, in particular the costs of human-wildlife conflict. In other words, the practice of revenue sharing does not appear to be well aligned with the current policy which clearly indicates that revenue sharing should prioritise the mitigation of human-wildlife conflict (Mackenzie 2012; Harrison *et al.* 2015).


Figure 4a: Process for revenue-sharing project identification, prioritisation, selection, approval and integration into local government development plans



Source: UWA 2012.

Notes: CAO – Chief Administrative Officer, CAM – Conservation Area Manager, CDO – Community Development Officer, DEO – District Environment Officer, DNRO – District Natural Resources Officer, HLG – Higher local government, LLG – lower local government, PMC – Project Management Committee.

Figure 4b: Reporting hierarchy in current revenue-sharing guidelines



Source: UWA 2012.

Learning from the history of revenue sharing at Bwindi Impenetrable National Park

Bwindi Impenetrable National Park (BINP) is an Afromontane forest in southwest Uganda, particularly known for its population of Mountain Gorillas and the exceptional diversity of birds. Partly because of its high conservation value, the area has attracted major investments in programmes to increase the support of local communities for conservation, starting in the late eighties. These cover six main types of integrated conservation and development (ICD) strategies:

- Access to non-timber forest products (called multiple use schemes)

- Bwindi and Mgahinga Conservation Trust which invests in community projects supporting conservation as well as PA management and research
- Conservation-based tourism enterprise
- Revenue sharing (total revenue shared in 2015 was US\$250,000)
- Resource substitution (mostly tree planting), and
- Agriculture and other enterprise interventions.

A comprehensive study of the first 15 years of work on these strategies was published by Blomley *et al.* in 2010.

“Results from the study show that community attitudes to the parks have improved greatly in the period between gazettement and when the study was undertaken, and ICD strategies appear to have played an important role in this. The poorest people generally have less positive attitudes, but when they receive park-related benefits, it leads to a higher level of attitude change than for richer people. Crop raiding by wildlife has a negative impact on attitudes, and while this damage seems to affect different wealth categories equally, the negative impact on attitudes of the poor is much greater. Community cooperation with park authorities has also improved, particularly willingness to assist in fighting fires and to a lesser extent reporting of illegal activities, and ICD strategies have again played an important role in this improvement.”

Extract from: Development and gorillas? Assessing fifteen years of integrated conservation and development in south-western Uganda (Blomley *et al.* 2010)

Using a household survey, the study by Blomley *et al.* explored how attitudes towards BINP had changed since the PA was formed (from a forest reserve) in 1991, and the types of intervention that people felt had contributed most to this change (see Figure 5 below). Revenue sharing ranked third after a larger agriculture programme undertaken by CARE and the Bwindi and Mgahinga Conservation Trust.

Another key finding of the study was how much the negative impact of crop raiding by wildlife affects attitudes to conservation, particularly of poorer people (see Figures 6 and 7) and how much the change in attitude that is attributable to revenue sharing varies according to the wellbeing of the respondent. In other words, crop raiding is much more significant as a cause of negative attitudes (ie resentment) amongst poorer people and, at the time of the study, revenue sharing had a particularly important role in countering this. It is important to bear in mind that at this stage in the development of the revenue sharing at BINP (2010) the funds were invested primarily in infrastructure projects that tended to benefit the community as a whole (such as schools and road restoration) rather than income generating projects of a group of individuals.

Figure 5: Percentage of people citing each factor as a cause of improved attitudes (n=276)




Figure 6: Impact of crop damage on community attitudes (n=422)





Figure 7: Attitude scores of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of revenue sharing (n=422)



Source: Figures 5–7 reproduced from Blomley *et al.* (2010)

2

Research methodology

Overall purpose

The study on which this research report is based aimed to support outcomes at three different levels:

- Site level: strengthen the implementation of revenue sharing at BINP to become both more effective and more equitable
- National level: inform the ongoing process of developing a national revenue-sharing regulation based on the existing 2012 national guidelines, and
- Global level: influence policy and practice for sharing revenue from a variety of conservation-related sources at other sites of great ape conservation within Africa and Asia to become both more effective and more equitable.

This report is targeted at the national and global levels. Findings from the research have also been translated into pointers for improving practice at the park level, and have been shared with officials developing the new national revenue-sharing regulations.

Learning questions

Since a primary objective of this study is to strengthen policy and practice, the study was framed as a learning evaluation focusing on the specific key issues that emerged from the recent studies of revenue sharing in Uganda referred to in the previous section. These nine issues (see Box 1) are likely to be applicable to almost any revenue-sharing scheme associated with a PA in a developing country context. For each issue, 1–3 questions were framed as being specific to the context of Bwindi Impenetrable National Park.

Box 1: Key issues and learning questions

1. **Funding flow:** To what extent and in what ways does passing the RS funds through local government/local administration at district, sub-county and parish levels increase or reduce the impact of RS versus its stated objectives?
2. **Boundary:** In terms of its role in mitigating negative impacts of conservation should RS also target people who are negatively impacted by PA conservation but who live further from the PA than the current designated limit (villages that actually touch/border the PA)?
3. **Monitoring and reporting:** How might the allocation of monitoring and reporting roles between different stakeholders be modified and strengthened to enhance efficiency and accountability, and avoid possible conflicts of interest?
4. **Governance structures:** How well have the various committees performed their designated functions and adhered to guidance that is designed to ensure good governance? How might the performance of these committees be improved?
5. **Project type:** What types of projects should be funded by RS to maximise its impact versus its stated objectives? What types of projects contribute more to conservation goals versus improving wellbeing/reducing poverty, ie what should be the project selection criteria?
6. **Project selection process:** How should projects be selected and by whom (ie at what level and with what process) to: (a) maximise alignment with whatever selection criteria are agreed, and (b) maximise the contribution of governance per se (recognition and procedure) to the stated objectives of RS?
7. **Equity:** How do community members, park managers and local government intermediaries in the RS process understand equitable conservation and equitable RS, and to what extent are different types of RS projects contributing to improving equity in conservation?
8. **Trade-offs:** What are the likely trade-offs between potential measures to deliver more effective conservation and more equitable conservation including trade-offs between different notions of equity?
9. **Pathways to impact:** to what extent do the six different impact pathways identified in the theory of change (and/or other pathways) contribute to conservation impact?

Methods

The fieldwork for the learning evaluation study was conducted between October 2015 to June 2016. The study used a mixed approach combining the following six methods:

1. **Household survey.** This was conducted in two phases. The first phase, focusing only on the two PA-adjacent parishes of Kisoro District, was undertaken as part of a previous study. Phase two, supported by this study, covered the remaining 24 PA-adjacent parishes that lie in Kabale and Kanungu Districts. Community-based monitors were trained in advance to lead the survey and also to continue to monitor the progress of revenue sharing after the survey was completed. The sample size was sixteen respondents (eight men and eight women) for each frontline parish (LC2) that had more than one village, and eight respondents in parishes with only one village, making a total sample size of 520. Stratified sampling was applied to categorise men and women, and Batwa and non-Batwa, as separate beneficiaries in each parish. They were then randomly selected from the list of RS beneficiaries for 2012, 2013 and 2014.
2. **Key informant interviews.** A total of thirty key informants from the community, local government, UWA and tourism operators were interviewed by staff of the Institute of Tropical Forest Conservation (ITFC).
3. **Focus group discussions.** ITFC staff facilitated focus group discussion (FGDs) with the assistance of the community-based monitors. One focus group discussion was conducted in each of the 27 PA-adjacent parishes, each with a mix of RS beneficiaries and non beneficiaries.
4. **Stakeholder workshop.** A one-day workshop was held on 28 April 2016. The purpose was to discuss the results from methods 1–3 with key stakeholders and to develop some recommendations for strengthening revenue-sharing policy and practice. The workshop focused in particular on boundary issues, monitoring and reporting, types of project and equity (ie learning questions 2, 3, 5 and 7).
5. **Mini survey of key informants.** A small opinion survey on pathways to conservation impact was initially completed by the 24 participants in the stakeholder workshop with some help from the workshop facilitators. The survey tool asks the respondent to what extent they agree or disagree with six statements about the significance of different pathways to impact (see next sub-section). When the results generated from this pilot appeared credible, the survey was subsequently extended to a total of 60 respondents who were purposively selected and interviewed by trained ITFC field staff.

Theory of change/impact pathways

The ninth learning question relates to a theory of change that was developed by the authors of this report at the start of the learning evaluation, based on their collective experience at BINP, and recent work on equity and protected areas with which the two researchers have been closely involved.³

The theory of change (see Figure 8) was developed during the design of the learning evaluation, with the understanding that this would be revised where necessary in the light of the findings. It defines six different pathways by which a revenue-sharing scheme, governed in line with the current Uganda revenue-sharing guidelines, might deliver conservation impact – see Table 1 below. These are characterised by the equity dimension and whether the pathway relates to reducing demand for PA resources, reducing negative resentment towards the PA, or increasing positive support for the PA.

The theory of change is based on the equity framework described in Section 1 with its three dimensions of recognition, procedure and distribution (Schreckenber *et al.* 2016). It is assumed that revenue sharing delivers a positive conservation impact through a combination of one or more different pathways, some that relate to distributive equity and some that relate to a combination of recognition and procedural equity (ie policy, institutions, structures and processes of revenue sharing rather than the actual benefits).



Focus group discussion (Twinamatsiko 2016)

³ The Principle Investigator, Phil Franks, worked at BINP from 1993–1998 as Project Manager of the CARE Development Through Conservation project which had a key role in the establishment of the revenue-sharing scheme and has subsequently worked on many payments for ecosystem services initiatives including REDD+. Medard Twinamatsiko has many years of experience conducting social research relating to BINP. This includes a PhD entitled 'Linking Conservation to the Implementation of Revenue Sharing Policy and Livelihood Improvement of People Bordering BINP'. This report includes a significant amount of material from Medard's research.

Figure 8: Revenue-sharing pathways to conservation impact, initial theory of change




Table 1: Possible impact pathways by which a revenue-sharing scheme might deliver conservation impact (governed in line with the current Uganda revenue-sharing guidelines)

Possible impact pathways	Increasing support for the PA	Reducing resentment towards the PA	Reducing demand for PA resources
Distributive equity	B: Revenue sharing increases the support of local communities for the PA through more benefits being provided by the PA	D: Revenue sharing reduces the resentment of local people towards the PA through reducing costs related to human-wildlife conflict or loss of access to PA resources	F: Revenue sharing reduces unauthorised use of PA resources by providing local people with alternative sources of income or substitutes for PA resources
Recognition and procedural equity	C: Revenue sharing increases the support of local communities for the PA through giving more recognition to their PA-related interests, and increasing their participation in PA matters	E: Revenue sharing reduces the resentment of local people towards the PA through giving more recognition to their PA-related problems and increasing their participation in finding solutions	
Not related to equity at community/household level	A: Revenue sharing increases the support of local government and local administration for the PA		

3

Results

This section focuses on the results from the two surveys conducted by this study – the household survey within communities adjacent to BINP (method 1) and the mini survey of key stakeholder opinions on different pathways to conservation impact (method 5). Results from the key qualitative data gathering tools are taken up in Section 4, as they contributed mainly to the interpretation of the quantitative survey data.

Household survey respondents' characteristics

The household survey included information on the basic characteristics of the respondent households, who were all beneficiaries of one or more revenue-sharing projects during the period 2012–14. Key parameters included the gender, age and ethnicity of the respondent, distance of their household from the nearest road and the annual cycle of revenue sharing in which they were a beneficiary (see Table 2).

Table 2: Household survey respondents characteristics

Characteristics	Respondent details
Gender	Male 68%, female 32%
Age	21–40 42%, 41–60 37%, >60 21%
Ethnicity	Bakiga 98.5%, Bufumbira 0.9%, Batwa 0.6%
Distance from road	< 1 hour 73%, > 1 hour 27%
Beneficiary year	2012 34%, 2013 51%, 2014 15%

This data shows that RS beneficiaries were disproportionately men (more than two thirds). Reference to overall population demographic data also indicates that the Batwa⁴ were underrepresented. In terms of beneficiary year, the high proportion of beneficiaries in 2013 is more to do with the nature of the projects than the amount of money disbursed, which was similar across the three years.

Understanding of revenue-sharing guidelines

Seventy-three per cent of RS beneficiaries said that they were not aware of, or did not understand, the current UWA revenue-sharing guidelines, with the percentage being slightly higher in Kisoro and Kabale districts. The vast majority of respondents however (97 per cent), were at least aware that the revenue shared comes from the PA.

Attendance of awareness meetings

Discussions with BINP staff and local leaders indicated that overall attendance of PA-related meetings by the general population is low. Results from the surveyed beneficiaries (n=520) however indicated that most people who benefited from RS had attended the RS meetings. The study did not assess whether those who attend meetings were more likely to benefit, but it is notable that 19 per cent of respondents who had never attended meetings did also receive benefits. Respondents who attended RS meetings were further asked about the channels of communication for awareness of the meetings, as part of determining whether the communication process purposively excluded people who did not attend meetings. Results show that most beneficiaries get information about meetings from their local leaders through word of mouth (52 per cent).

⁴ The Batwa are indigenous peoples who were historically hunter gatherers living within the forests of south-western Uganda and neighbouring DRC. In Uganda the Batwa were evicted from the forests during the colonial period but continued to live next to the forest and derive their livelihoods from it. However their access to the forest resources of Bwindi was stopped in 1992 when Bwindi forest reserve became a national park. This caused a great deal of suffering and efforts to mitigate the negative impact have been only partially successful leaving many Batwa still very impoverished and marginalised from decision making.

Involvement of revenue-sharing beneficiaries in consultations

Previous studies indicate that RS projects often fail because local beneficiaries are not involved in the process of project implementation (Twinamatsiko *et al.* 2014). This study asked whether RS beneficiaries were consulted before they received the benefit, and the results indicate that 76 per cent of beneficiaries were. This still leaves 24 per cent who were passive recipients however, largely people living in the more remote areas further from roads. Residents in Kanungu District were more often consulted than those in Kisoro and Kabale, a fact attributed both to their level of literacy and their better access to information from UWA. Beneficiaries were also asked whether their priorities were always met during selection and funding of projects. Results indicated that the majority of the beneficiaries surveyed received the benefits they wanted, with only 23 per cent not getting what they wanted. However, discussions in the later focus groups revealed a wide range of different approaches for selecting projects, which in many cases deviated from the current guidelines (see Section 4).

Attitudes of revenue-sharing beneficiaries towards Bwindi Impenetrable National Park

Most respondents agreed that getting RS benefits has improved their attitude towards the PA, with only six per cent saying that RS had made no difference to their attitude to the PA. This was attributed to the benefit they received having only a very small impact on their wellbeing and also governance weaknesses (see Section 4).


Revenue sharing and human-wildlife conflict

The UWA revenue-sharing guidelines state that the implementation of the RS must contribute significantly towards both reduction of HWC and improvement of livelihoods in communities adjacent to wildlife PAs. Most respondents (83 per cent) reported that there had been no funds allocated to address HWC in their community. Of the cases where funds have been allocated to HWC, it was reported that this was mainly for paying people who chased animals back into the PA (the so-called vermin guards). This is just one type of mitigation measure. No money was spent on avoidance measures (eg fencing) or compensation measures. In most of the 27 follow-up focus group discussions community members did not appear to know that the RS guidelines require that revenue-sharing funds address HWC, or that HWC should get a large proportion of available funds.

Monitoring and project follow-up

According to the UWA guidelines of 2013, 5 per cent of total available funds should be allocated to oversight by local governments at sub-county and district levels, including monitoring. Only 41 per cent of survey respondents reported that there had been any monitoring of their RS project, and in all cases this was done by UWA staff with support from village leaders whose input was entirely on a voluntary basis. Very few respondents reported any monitoring by the sub-county and district governments (see Figure 9).

Figure 9: Respondents reporting monitoring of RS projects by different government officials



Notes: LC1 (village level), LC2 (parish level), LC3 (sub-county level). Stretcher group is a self-help community group to assist those who become sick.

Perceptions on whether revenue sharing has addressed its intended objectives

In the survey, RS beneficiaries were asked whether they thought RS is achieving the three objectives that are specified in the current guidelines and to give examples of how it is doing so. There seems to be a broad consensus that RS is achieving all three objectives, with building support for conservation receiving a slightly higher score (70 per cent of respondents being in agreement) than the other two objectives (see Table 3).

Table 3: Respondents reporting RS achieving its three objectives and respondents ideas on why it has or has not achieved these objectives

Objective	Demonstrating economic value (60%)	Enhancing community-park relationships (60%)	Building support for conservation (70%)
Key factors contributing to achieving the objective	<p>Direct benefits from projects especially common goods</p> <p>Food security</p> <p>Secondary benefits from projects funded</p>	<p>Benefits generated from revenue sharing</p> <p>Local social support</p> <p>Interaction with park staff and stakeholders</p> <p>Consultations on project selection</p>	<p>No fire outbreaks</p> <p>Voluntary participation of communities such as HUGO</p> <p>Attending conservation activities</p> <p>Reduced illegal activities</p>
Key factors contributing to not achieving the objective	<p>Intangible benefits</p> <p>Misuse of funds by leaders</p> <p>Unsustainable projects</p> <p>No monitoring</p>	<p>Poor implementation</p> <p>Poor quality of funded projects</p> <p>No full community involvement</p>	<p>Illegal activities ongoing</p> <p>Poor attendance to RS activities</p> <p>Poor community attitude towards the park</p> <p>Limited benefits vs costs</p>

Pathways to conservation impact

The results of the mini survey of key stakeholder representatives on their opinion of the six different pathways to conservation impact are shown in Figure 10. Three different major stakeholder groups – government officials at local level, local communities and conservation agencies (UWA at BINP and associated NGOs) – were asked to consider the six pathways to conservation impact as defined in the learning evaluation's theory of change. The scores range from +2 (strongly agree) to -2 (strongly disagree). Average scores for the three groups were 0.83, 0.81 and 0.69 respectively, which suggests that the conservation agency stakeholders have a slightly lower level of confidence in the efficacy of all pathways than the other two groups.

As this was the first time the researchers had used this kind of tool, and the concepts are quite complex, some erratic results were anticipated; but to the contrary, a clear pattern emerged indicating that a pathway based on increasing community support through a flow of benefits from the PA (pathway B) is considered far more significant than a pathway that offers livelihood alternatives without clear linkage to the PA (pathway F). Furthermore, the recognition and procedure pathway for revenue sharing appears crucial, second only to the actual delivery of benefits (see Figure 10).


The importance of the recognition and procedure pathway is even more evident on the cost side, where it is considered by all the major stakeholder groups to be more significant than the pathway that focuses on actual success of cost mitigation measures. This finding is in line with findings of other recent research in Uganda on the significance of resentment as a motivation for illegal activity, and the importance of recognition and procedure in this respect (Harrison *et al.* 2015).

Another striking finding from the opinion survey was that the diversity of views on a given pathway seemed to be higher with the pathways that are generally considered less significant – as indicated by the error bars which indicate a confidence interval for the mean scores. A growing difference between the opinions of different stakeholder groups seems to be the main factor, more than growing diversity of views within major stakeholder groups. This is particularly striking with the ‘increasing local government support pathway’ in which conservation stakeholders seem to have little faith, and with the ‘alternative livelihoods’ in which no stakeholder seems to have much faith other than communities themselves.



Training community-based monitors (Twinamatsiko 2016)

Figure 10: Opinions on the six pathways to conservation impact defined by the theory of change held by three major stakeholder groups (government officials at local level, local communities and conservation agencies)



Scale: +2 = strongly agree, -2 = strongly disagree.

4

Discussion

The following eight sub-sections discuss the findings relating to the nine learning questions (questions 5 and 6 on project type and selection have been merged). As well as drawing on the results of the household and stakeholder surveys, as presented in Section 5, they draw extensively on the results from the other three methods – focus group discussions, key informant interviews and the stakeholder workshop. In addition, the findings build upon previous research conducted by Twinamatsiko *et al.* (2014). While this study focuses on Bwindi Impenetrable National Park in Uganda, the learning applies to any revenue-sharing scheme that is expected to contribute to the achievement of conservation goals, including PES schemes that have a degree of explicit conditionality that does not exist with revenue sharing in Uganda. Each sub-section therefore concludes with a paragraph on learning with wider relevance.

Flow of funds from the Uganda Wildlife Authority to community projects

To what extent and in what ways does passing RS funds through local government/ administration at district, sub-county and parish levels increase or reduce the impact of RS versus its stated objectives?

Leakages

'Leakages' is a euphemism for diversion of RS funds to other purposes, which may be public (other activities of local government) or private (corruption). This issue was directly raised in 7 out of 27 focus groups (and implicitly acknowledged in a further 16 in comments that RS would be more equitable if funds went directly from UWA

to the communities). In many discussions communities also noted that the funds that communities receive do not match the information they have received on the allocation (eg via radio).

This learning evaluation had planned to include a specific piece of research on the flow of funds down the chain from UWA to community level, via LC5 and LC3 levels of local government, but this proved impossible as many sub-counties (LC3) were unwilling to provide the necessary information. Nevertheless there is sufficient evidence to conclude that there are substantial 'leakages' although there is no estimate of what percentage of the funds are being lost in this way and to what extent these are real losses versus legitimate transaction costs.

Delays in disbursement

Many of the government officials interviewed expressed concern over the delays in disbursing funds. For example at the time of writing this report funds generated from tourism in the year 2015 have yet to be released. The reason for this delay appears to be that UWA will not release funds from a new cycle until they have received accounts for the previous round from all 16 sub-counties; thus the entire process can be held up by one poorly performing sub-county. Such delays lead to high levels of frustration that fuel resentment in the community and thus undermine the contribution of revenue sharing to conservation goals that is generated via pathway E.

Community versus local government priorities

In the early days of RS at BINP, funds were transferred directly from UWA to the local administrative unit of government or community group implementing the selected project. This changed with the Local Government Act of 1997 that requires that all funds coming from a government agency to support activities within the mandate of local government must be channelled through local government. There are two different issues here: a) the requirement that such funds be administered by local government and b) the assumption by local government that use of the funds should support, or at least not conflict with, their development plans.

Although the process of identifying RS projects to be funded starts with meetings at village level and then a prioritisation process at parish level, many examples were given of community priorities being changed by the local governments at sub-county and/or district level. Local government officials justify this based on the need for all projects funded through local government to align with the development plans of the area. The problem is that the objectives of RS sharing do not align with the objectives of the local government development plans. This has become more of an issue in recent years, as RS policy puts increasing emphasis on addressing HWC, which is not a responsibility of local government in Uganda other than control of so-called vermin animals. Furthermore,

the requirement to align with development plans runs the real risk of a zero-sum game for conservation if conservation revenue becomes just part of a basket of development funding enabling local government to target its own scarce resources to other areas.

Learning with wider relevance

The importance of avoiding leakages and major delays in funds disbursement is obvious and the greater the number of different sections and joints in the pipeline the greater the risk of leakage and delays. It is important to note that this is not just because benefits are less than they should be and/or arrive late; these problems can also seriously undermine the contribution of the procedural/recognition pathways (C and E) as local people become frustrated and disillusioned with the process and, more fundamentally, the lack of respect shown by local government authorities that are supposed to serve them. Arguably an RS scheme with less financial resources, but a high level of transparency and downward accountability, could be just as effective in terms of both conservation and social impact goals.

The risk of a zero-sum game for conservation may also be described as lack of additionality – conservation revenue failing to deliver value to local people over and above the basic service provision obligations of local government. This undermines both the conservation and social impact of conservation-based revenue. In theory this can be overcome through policy/regulations and associated monitoring that ensures that while funds are administered through local government they are allocated according to the goals of the funding scheme. In other words, while the management functions of RS can be those of local government, the governance structures and processes of RS should be specific to RS reflecting its unique goals and governance principles. The management function should include providing technical support, monitoring, and checking that RS projects do not undermine the development goals of local government, but without changing the priorities to increase alignment.

Irrespective of any leakages, there is an inevitable issue of the high transaction costs associated with engaging multiple levels of government. If these different levels of government are each adding value then the transaction costs can be justified, but this does not seem to be the case at BINP where there seem to be overlapping roles – notably in project monitoring. To some extent however this is hardwired into the multi-layer local government system, which limits possibilities for streamlining procedures to reduce transaction costs.

Overall it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the benefits of passing RS funds through local government appear to be outweighed by the transaction costs and risks of delays and corruption. In the specific case of BINP a viable alternative might be to channel RS funds through the existing conservation trust fund (BMCT). As with the existing arrangement through local government, there would be a need for clear separation of

governance (decision making according to the goals of RS) from management and administration. The ultimate goals of BMCT and RS are the same but their strategies are significantly different, notably in RS there is a much tighter geographic focus and strong emphasis on HWC, which BMCT does not have.

“The money passes through various stages. By the time it reaches us a lot of money is cut. What they announce on the radio is not what we receive. This makes the system unfair to local people and brings conflicts between us and leaders.”
An elderly man in Nyamabale parish

In other PAs in Uganda and elsewhere, site-based NGOs, trusts, or even a company could administer the RS scheme, so long as there is strong governance oversight from an appropriate multi-stakeholder board. Where revenues are very small it may make sense for the scheme to be managed as a unit of PA management with community participation in decision making, but it is always good practice to separate management and governance functions.

In BINP and other PAs in Uganda with substantial RS schemes that have been operating for more than 20 years, most beneficiaries are aware that the revenue is conservation-based and dependent on the ongoing success of conservation efforts. Where there is no explicit conditionality between benefits and beneficiary behaviour, knowledge of this linkage is vital to the contribution of RS to conservation – this is the difference between pathway B and pathway F in the theory of change. In this respect, the more that the entity managing the RS scheme is clearly identified with the PA the better.

Geographical boundary for targeting benefits


In terms of its role in mitigating negative impacts of conservation should RS also target people who are negatively impacted by PA conservation but who live further from the PA than the current designated limit (villages that touch/border the PA)?

Farmland or residence

When the RS scheme at BINP was established in 1996 any projects within parishes bordering the park were eligible for funding. Figure 11 shows most projects as being within 2km of the park boundary. Parishes typically extend from 2–5km from the park boundary. The RS guidelines issued by UWA in 2012 narrowed the geographic focus to the villages (LC1s) within the PA-adjacent parishes that actually border the PA boundary. This was presumably intended to reflect increased emphasis on mitigating the negative social impacts of the PA which fall most heavily on those closest to the park – notably crop raiding by wildlife. However this has been controversial since the targeting criteria is

based on where a person lives and there are many people who farm next to the PA but actually live in a more distant village. In most of the focus groups where this issue was discussed there was a consensus that the key criteria in setting the outer geographic boundary for RS should be the extent of land that is regularly affected by crop-raiding, but there were differences on how to prioritise within this area. In Kiyebe and Karangara parishes focus group participants suggested that those farming land beyond PA adjacent villages, and who are affected by crop raiding, should also receive benefits but a relatively smaller amount.

Figure 11: Map of revenue-sharing projects 1996 to 2013



Date produced: 25 March 2014
 Source: Twinamatsiko (2015)

Some key informants suggested that the level of benefits allocated to an individual should depend not only on the level of crop damage they incur from wildlife but also the contribution they make to measures to reduce crop damage, such as planting of Mauritius thorn fences. In terms of other forms of support for PA management, such as reporting illegal activities and helping control fires, it was noted that those concerned – the ‘first responders’ – are more likely to be people living close to the PA thus making the case for retaining the existing tight definition of the outer boundary.

These differing viewpoints on how to define the outer boundary of the area within which people can benefit from RS were discussed in depth at the stakeholder workshop in April 2016. Strengths of the current tight focus were noted to be that it focuses benefits on the most negatively impacted communities even if not necessarily on the most negatively impacted households within these communities, and that it simplifies the logistics of monitoring and evaluation.

The discussion of weaknesses of the current approach focused mainly on the exclusion of people whose land was affected by crop raiding but who do not live in the front-line villages. It was noted that these people see this as very unfair and this may motivate them to engage in some illegal activities “as payback for missing out on revenue sharing”. In conclusion there was a broad consensus that the outer boundary should revert back to the parish level but this should not imply that anyone within the parish should benefit as the other key criteria – that benefits of RS should preferentially target the communities and households within these communities affected by crop raiding – should also apply. It was noted that this is also more appropriate for other PAs in Uganda where HWC affecting livestock frequently extends further from the PA than crop damage, and the national RS policy must work for all PAs in the country.

Learning with wider relevance

Over the years strategies for delineating the target area for RS at BINP have ranged from a very tight focus on purely the people who live within PA adjacent villages (ie maximum 2km from the PA boundary) to, at the other extreme, the targeting strategy of the Bwindi and Mgahinga Conservation Trust whose target area for development projects extends to all the sub-counties bordering the park (up to 15km in some places). In defining such a large target area at the start of the trust in 1995 one factor was a concern that investment of the substantial resources of the trust in perpetuity on a small area might result in so much progress in development that in-migration would increase human pressure on PA resources. Over the 30+ year history of Integrated Conservation Development Projects this concern has often been raised, particularly by critics of more people-friendly approaches to conservation, but across thousands of projects worldwide the only consistent evidence of this appears to be employment in conservation based tourism which has in many PAs worldwide, including Bwindi, led to enclaves around

tourism facilities that may well have a negative environmental impact. At Bwindi, despite 20 years of major investment in ICD programming, villages adjacent to the PA beyond the few tourism enclaves remain significantly poorer in terms of basic wellbeing indicators (Bush and Mwesigwa 2008; Twinamatsiko *et al.* 2014).

In summary, the recommendation emerging from the stakeholder workshop seems sound – define an outer geographic boundary that aims to be inclusive of most people who are likely to be negatively impacted by the PA, but then have targeting criteria that ensure that within this overall target area benefits are not spread out equally but rather are clearly targeted based on one or more equity criteria drawn from the PA equity framework described in Section 1 (see Table 4).

Table 4: Equity criteria to guide targeting of benefits resulting from RS

1	Level of cost incurred that can be attributed to the PA, eg from human-wildlife conflict
2	Rights, ie affirmative action in favour of social groups that have foregone rights (eg Batwa), or in favour of social groups that have a statutory right to get priority treatment (eg those residing in villages next to the PA – a statutory right under the new RS regulations).
3	Contribution to conservation, eg providing labour to construct fences to reduce crop damage, guard crops against wildlife damage, help park staff control fires and reduce illegal activities.

Where the third criteria extends beyond protecting local people's property, to working with the PA authority on certain PA management activities, then the issue becomes one of a broader co-management arrangement where RS should be a key element of the incentive system. UWA does have a 'collaborative management' policy but, as yet, not one that takes co-management to this level.

Who should be monitoring and reporting on revenue sharing?

How might the allocation of monitoring and reporting roles between different stakeholders be modified and strengthened to enhance efficiency and accountability and avoid possible conflicts of interest?

Monitoring and evaluation

The current RS guidelines make a distinction between monitoring which should take place primarily through regular meetings at village level (LC1), and evaluation of the success of different projects and the scheme as a whole, which should take place once

a year. The monitoring meetings are to be convened and facilitated by the LC1 Chairman and the Parish Chief, and the new draft RS regulation adds that Community Development Officers should also be engaged. The annual evaluation is to be convened by UWA's Conservation Area Manager. To contribute to the costs of their oversight role, including monitoring, local government retains 5 per cent of the total amount of RS funds.

In the household survey only 41 per cent of respondents reported that some monitoring activity had taken place, and that monitoring activities were mostly conducted by UWA staff and LC1 leaders. In the key informant interviews, 8 local government officials reported that they were not sure how their 5 per cent allocation of RS funds was used. According to the current guidelines, the 5 per cent is for oversight in general not just monitoring, and communities may not always be aware of time spent by local government staff on some aspects of oversight. Further clarification is needed on exactly what the 5 per cent is supposed to be covering in terms of the responsibilities of local government staff. Within local government there is a view that 5 per cent is not sufficient for them to provide the same level of oversight that they do for their own activities. In this sense the 5 per cent is just a 'token of appreciation' from UWA. Some local government officials expressed the view that both planning and monitoring for RS should be fully integrated within the normal systems of local government.

Periodic monitoring and evaluation of the type of RS proposed has at least three vital functions: a) generating information to promote/ensure accountability, b) stimulating learning which can be used to improve the RS scheme, and c) giving UWA confidence that their money is being well spent. It does not seem to be performing satisfactorily in any of these three areas. UWA's level of confidence in the scheme appears to come more from the regular interaction of community conservation rangers with community leaders than from any formal monitoring process.

For the purposes of this study a team of voluntary 'community-based monitors' was established and trained – two per parish making a total of 54: In Kisoro District this community-based monitoring system had already been established several years ago by the Kisoro NGO Forum. The intention was that the system would continue to operate after the end of this study but there is a question around their institutional home. Given that the main purpose is promoting downward accountability of local government officials to community members, it has been suggested that they might report to the UWA Community Conservation Warden. However there is no precedent for such an arrangement in UWA. Alternatively, as in Kisoro District, they could report to a civil society platform, but no such platform currently exists in Kanungu and Kabale Districts.

Lastly there is a fear that monitoring encourages 'whistle-blowing' that will land all parties in trouble. Of course there is some truth in this and one focus group gave an example of a case where UWA staff were caught conniving with local government officials to misuse RS funds. However it needs to be understood that while monitoring may reveal occasional

cases of gross misconduct it is not designed for this purpose but rather as a tool for generally promoting good governance.

Reporting

The current RS guidelines specify an elaborate reporting hierarchy (see Figure 4b in Section 1) that is supposed to generate reports on a quarterly basis. Not surprisingly, key informant interviews revealed that compliance with these reporting procedures is very patchy. Presumably this reporting system is modelled on that for other project-type expenditure in local government but it is not apparent that it is fit for purpose in this case. Reporting frequency should perhaps be changed to reduce the burden whilst at the same time taking stronger action to enforce compliance, particularly with financial reporting from sub-county to district level, which appears to be the main cause of the major delays in disbursing RS funds.

Learning with wider relevance

As with management of any type of project, monitoring, evaluation and reporting are vital functions in a RS scheme. The tendency to apply a blueprint, 'catch all' approach must be resisted however as this may impose such a burden on the system that it crashes because people cannot see the point of much of the data gathering and lose motivation to continue.

Ideally in a situation where the M&E and reporting systems are not predefined, the starting point for specifying these should be clearly defining the purpose – and there will normally be several objectives. Accountability for proper implementation and funds utilised will always be a key objective, although to what extent this is upward to senior management versus downward to community members is a key issue. In the latter case where community members are collecting the information and the community is a key user of the information then the system can be genuinely described as community based. This is different from a situation where community members are collecting information to serve the needs of an external agency.

Beyond generating basic information needed to promote accountability, regular monitoring has a crucial role to play in ensuring key provisions of the revenue-sharing strategy are being complied with (which in turn are key in delivering the impact that will be assessed through evaluation). Most crucial in this respect is the strategy for benefit targeting which ultimately determines the social and conservation impact. The three criteria that individually, or in weighted combination, guide targeting between and within communities were listed in the previous section.

In order to safeguard against well known biases in benefit-sharing schemes it is vital that information on targeting and its alignment (or otherwise) with the criteria is socially differentiated by gender, by any other significant exclusion factors (eg ethnicity, religion),

and by poverty/vulnerability status. In the case of BINP there has been some attempt to monitor the degree to which the marginalised Batwa indigenous people and women benefit from the RS scheme, but no attempt to monitor their participation in the decision-making processes that define who gets what.

Performance of governance structures

How well have the various committees performed their designated functions and adhered to guidance that is designed to ensure good governance? How might the performance of these committees be improved?

Performance of committees

At community level the current RS guidelines require the formation of two committees – a project management committee (PMC) for each proposed project that is proposed at village level and, once a project has been approved, a project procurement committee (PPC) to oversee any procurement associated with the project. Furthermore, the existing Parish Development Committee (PDC) has an important role in reviewing and prioritising the proposals coming from the different villages within the parish.

A number of focus groups and key informant interviews reported that these committees often exist in name only – particularly as the management committee that proposes a project is often just one person. Reasons given for this mainly revolve around costs and lack of incentives, since there are no funds to reimburse travel costs or pay a food allowance for committee meetings. Also, the delay in disbursement of funds is greatly demotivating – committees formed in 2015 are still waiting to receive funds. This affects the reputation of committee members who may be regarded by other community members as inefficient and/or corrupt.

There is also an issue of parallel structures as the relationship between PMC and LC1 is unclear since the PMC chairman is said to report to the next level up (LC2). This is not clear in the guidelines and this ambiguity has led to disengagement of some LC1 Chairmen who have a crucial role to play in the revenue-sharing scheme.

“The tenderers are bringing to us poor quality projects, the tendering policies which are put in place are not favourable for local people who are supposed to be beneficiaries.”

Teacher Karamira (Rubimbwa Parish, Kirima Sub County)

Membership of both the PMC and PPC is clearly stipulated in the guidelines – people who can read and write, two of whom should be women. Several focus groups on the less developed southern side of BINP identified the generally lower education level of people in this area compared with the more developed areas on the northern side as a constraint, and the household survey reveals that only 20 per cent of respondents feel

that they have a basic understanding of the RS guidelines. This indicates a need for some basic capacity building especially for the PMCs that have to identify, design and plan appropriate projects, but the fact that PMCs exist only for one project suggests that training the village (LC1) Chairperson may be a better use of scarce resources. It was also noted by several groups that the women members of PMC and PPC often have little influence suggesting a need for special attention to gender equality in decision making and accountability.

Specifically with respect to PPC, several focus groups and key informant interviews noted that the committee is supposed to ensure good governance of the procurement process but does not have the power to make sub-county government accountable in terms of following proper procurement procedures. Several examples were given of where selection of tenderers to supply key project inputs has been made at sub-county level and then the PPC simply 'rubber stamps' procurement papers knowing that there is corruption but powerless to do anything about it.

Learning with wider relevance

With the change in governance structure at the top level that took place when local government took over management of RS, there has been a shift in power balance away from members of local communities to civil servants in local government. Civil servants are more likely to favour projects that deliver on development goals and less likely to take conservation goals into account no matter how well the conservation and social agenda is expressed through project selection criteria. Many focus groups and interviews also noted the risk of project selection being influenced by aspiring local politicians using RS promises to secure votes.

The learning here is the importance of 'hard wiring' social and conservation safeguards⁵ into the governance structures and processes of a RS scheme. Safeguards should include both provisions that directly affect the conservation and social impact of RS projects (eg project selection criteria) and also procedural safeguards relating to the balance of power in governance structures and processes. Procedural safeguards are often expressed as principles of good governance, typically relating to transparency, accountability, participation in decision making and dispute resolution (Borrini-Feyerabend, G *et al.* 2013). Most importantly, there is a need for simple, credible mechanisms to monitor, encourage and where necessary enforce compliance with agreed safeguards, and this is where the Uganda RS policy is weak. Social and conservation safeguards are only as strong as the mechanism that encourages compliance.

⁵ Safeguards are specific normative policies that state how a process or outcome should be, and are designed not only to avoid negative impacts but also to increase positive impacts.

The other key issue regarding governance structures that emerges from the BINP case is the issue of incentives for participation. Why should local people volunteer to be members of a PMC or PPC at their own cost in terms of time and travel and with the risk of damage to their personal reputation resulting from delays in disbursement of funds? As is generally the case with volunteerism, the incentive is a mix of potential for personal gain and enhanced stature/respect within their community (social capital). It is vital that the latter is not severely eroded by inefficiencies in the system at higher levels.

Project type and selection process

What types of projects should be funded by RS to maximise its impact versus its stated objectives? What types of projects contribute more to conservation goals versus improving wellbeing/reducing poverty?

How should projects be selected and by whom (ie at what level and with what process) to (a) maximise alignment with whatever selection criteria are agreed, and (b) maximise the contribution of governance per se (recognition and procedure) to the stated objectives of RS?

In this section the above two questions are addressed as one, since they are closely related. There are essentially four sub-questions: why, what, who and how? The starting point has to be the goals of the revenue-sharing scheme (the why).

Goals of UWA revenue sharing

In summary the overall goal of RS is to *build a strong partnership leading to sustainable resource management within and around a PA by a) contributing to wellbeing and b) undertaking specific measures to gain support*. Point b) implicitly includes measures to reduce any resentment towards the PA.

It is unclear whether the goal statement actually means a) *and* b) or a) *or* b), and this is the source of much of the confusion around the type of projects that should be funded. This also remains unclear in the section of the RS guidelines on funding criteria which simply states: *RS Projects Funding Criteria comprises two parts: i) Contribution to reduction of human-wildlife conflict ii) Contribution to improvement of livelihoods of households in frontline LCIs*, although this does at least clarify that the measures to increase community support/reduce resentment should be focused on mitigation of HWC (rather than, for example, lost access to forest products).

The new RS regulations that are currently in draft form provide some further clarification in specifying that the parish-level process of prioritising projects submitted from village level shall be based on *the extent to which the identified projects address human-wildlife conflict as well as human welfare in an efficient and cost-effective manner*. This seems

to clarify that all projects are expected to make some contribution to HWC, though the relative weighting of the two remains unclear.

Human-wildlife conflict

In BINP both UWA and local government officials have interpreted the current guidelines as meaning that RS must improve wellbeing or reduce HWC. To help clarify this in practice UWA has advised that 15 per cent should be allocated to HWC and 85 per cent of funds should be allocated to livelihood improvement (ie without needing to address HWC). Only 17 per cent of survey respondents in the learning evaluation reported knowing of any support for HWC in their area, and where it existed this mostly took the form of incentives to people who chase wild animals out of farmland. In most of the 27 focus group discussions, community members did not appear to know that the RS guidelines require that RS funds address HWC, let alone that HWC should get a large proportion of available funds. At community level this appears to be genuine ignorance, while in local government this may reflect a view that, if there is indeed a choice, contributing to livelihoods is better aligned with district development plans. Either way the new RS regulation seems likely to make it clear that all projects funded under RS must contribute to HWC, and UWA and local government will need to adjust accordingly.

Drawing on and adapting the classic mitigation hierarchy for environmental impacts it is possible to identify three different ways in which RS might help to reduce HWC (Table 5).

Table 5: Three ways in which RS might help to reduce HWC with examples

Level in mitigation hierarchy	Examples
<i>Avoidance</i> of damage	Fencing that keeps problem animals in the PA and out of farms
<i>Minimisation</i> of damage	Use of deterrents (eg local people chasing animals, scare shooting by PA staff), planting less affected crops (eg tea)
<i>Restoration</i> of affected livelihoods	Cash compensation, in kind compensation (eg school bursary)

In terms of who gets the benefit from RS there are, as discussed earlier, essentially three different approaches to prioritising beneficiaries. Each represents a different interpretation of what would be considered fair under a certain set of circumstances (see Table 4).

For restoration of affected livelihoods there are two main categories of project:

- *Common good projects*: projects that by their nature offer benefits to most community members, eg support for a health centre, road rehabilitation that improves market access.
- *Alternative livelihood projects*: projects that provide income and/or natural resources from activities outside the PA that reduce demand for PA resources (hence alternative). These may be implemented by individuals or a group of people, eg a women's group. Either way, these can be seen as 'private good projects' as those involved can exclude others. Common examples at BINP include the distribution of goats.

Common good and alternative livelihood projects

Most of the projects funded by RS since its inception fall into these two main categories irrespective of any focus on HWC. The first ten years was characterised mainly by common good projects. The RS policy did not require a focus on HWC and project selection discussions (then at the parish level) tended to opt for projects that would benefit the maximum number of people. These projects were generally popular and played an important role in improving the relationship between people and PA that had been severely damaged by the creation of BINP in 1991. Over time concerns emerged, both with RS and the closely related BMCT, that common good projects would not reduce immediate threats to the PA – notably poaching. Led by powerful external stakeholders (UWA, donors, international NGOs) this led to a change in project type to alternative livelihood projects despite resistance from some local leaders who did not share this viewpoint.

Different views on whether to emphasise common good or private good/alternative livelihood projects continue to this day and this topic was hotly debated at the learning evaluation stakeholder workshop in April 2016. Points for and against are summarised in Table 6.

Table 6: Points for and against emphasising common good or alternative livelihoods projects highlighted at stakeholder workshop

Project type	Strengths	Weaknesses
Common good	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Easy to monitor progress Easy to measure impact on human wellbeing 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> More susceptible to abuse People not members of frontline villages automatically excluded Difficult to monitor and evaluate Does not bring out innovation
Alternative livelihood	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Addresses individual needs Household employment Individual projects are easier to manage Funds injected into the community (whereas common good projects tend to be awarded to outside contractors) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lack of ownership Difficult to mobilise community contribution Difficult to manage after completion Does not necessarily address needs of those most affected by the PA Requires a lot of funds Not easily linked to the existence of the PA (in the minds of some)

Despite differences, the workshop was able to generate a broad consensus around the following:

- All RS projects should to some extent contribute to addressing HWC (as per the new draft RS regulations)
- There should be a fixed per cent allocation that goes to projects that focus on reducing HWC as their primary objective, and
- There should be flexibility in the allocation of funds between common good and alternative livelihood projects according to which is considered by local people to have more value for conservation and wellbeing. In this context the RS guidelines and regulations clarify that 'local people' refers to both female and male members of PA adjacent villages (LC1).

Whereas with common good projects all village members may benefit in principle, the individual projects highlight a second targeting issue – given insufficient resources for all to benefit in a given cycle, who should be prioritised? Goat distribution has been done on a rotation basis that ensures all will benefit in time, but this is not a viable approach with enterprise projects. With respect to gender, two focus groups noted that gender

blindness is partly due to considering the beneficiary as being a whole household rather than individual men and women, young and old. In fact the guidelines do consistently refer to 'individuals and households' with the notable exception of the actual funding criteria which read as follows (and thus need to be adjusted): *RS Projects Funding Criteria comprises two parts: i) Contribution to reduction of human-wildlife conflict ii) Contribution to improvement of livelihoods of households in frontline LCIs.*

Focus group discussions identified that beneficiary households are selected in village meetings attended by community members or by local community leaders. Criteria used differ across parishes and *might* include whether a household is near to the park/affected by HWC, people engaging in illegal activities, the needy (eg people with HIV or who are vulnerable/marginalised in other ways), and whether households have previously benefited. These are essentially the equity criteria listed in Table 4, with the addition of a fourth criterion on needs.

Project selection process

The theory of the project selection process is clearly laid out in the current RS guidelines (see Section 1). Results from the household survey seem to indicate that the majority of beneficiaries of RS projects feel that they have been consulted to some extent in the selection of projects to be funded, which seems encouraging. A different picture emerges however from the focus groups and key informant interviews where a frequent complaint is that priorities are changed at the sub-county level. If this is being done to better align RS with local government development priorities then there is a need for UWA to clarify how the funding strategy of RS may differ from district development priorities, particularly with respect to HWC. At the same time the bottom up process that is described in the RS guidelines has also been undermined by a tendency of UWA staff and/or local government staff to advise communities on what their priority should be. There is a fine line here between making sure members of PA-adjacent villages are aware of the funding criteria while not steering their decision-making process.

Many focus groups, and one specific focus group with the Batwa, reported that they have very little influence in the project selection process. With the apex of the decision-making process at sub-county level being a technocratic platform this is hardly surprising, but the problem of marginalisation of women and Batwa already exists at the village level. In the Batwa focus group in Mpungu parish it was noted that Batwa are frequently not invited to village meetings where RS priorities are discussed and do not sit on any of the committees that make decisions on RS; and that if a Mutwa⁶ wants to be included as a beneficiary of an RS project he or she frequently has to offer a bribe which they cannot afford. Members of a non-Batwa focus group in Nyamabare parish also noted that the

⁶ Singular of Batwa.

lists of target beneficiaries that they produce at village level frequently get changed at higher levels to the disadvantage of more vulnerable people.

Learning with wider relevance

With the emergence and widespread application of the PES paradigm it is now clear that a key issue in developing and maintaining local support for conservation (in this case of a PA) is delivering a flow of relevant benefits over time whatever the exact nature of the benefit. Furthermore, there needs to be some level of conditional linkage – at least implicit if not explicit – between delivery of benefits and some specific metrics of conservation success. From this perspective a key issue is to maximise the value of the benefit to the intended beneficiaries, which gives further weight to the argument that it should be the beneficiaries themselves who determine the project type without second guessing by outsiders who may well have different value systems.

In this context the positive value of a benefit, such as building a fence to stop crop raiding or rehabilitating a school, is not a function of financial value per se but rather its actual contribution to human wellbeing over time. Likewise the real negative value of a cost such as crop damage lies not in its financial value (eg lost harvest) but in its negative impact on human wellbeing which may be far greater, as well illustrated by HWC at BINP where young people are kept home from school to guard crops. This is an example of a rational decision by a farmer to prioritise current benefit over a future cost, but based on a very high discount rate. From a societal perspective the discount rate should be much lower and thus the longer-term cost is much more significant and the farmer's decision appears irrational. Social protection schemes aim to avoid poor/vulnerable people having to erode their assets to address immediate needs. There is no such social protection scheme in southwest Uganda and it is unrealistic for conservation to think of tackling this aspect of the challenge, but it is important to recognise how poverty and vulnerability status seriously impact how a person judges a cost versus a benefit.

According to the Research Study theory of change (Figure 8, Section 2) strengthening the influence of members of PA-adjacent villages through measures to enhance recognition and procedure is key in its own right to delivering conservation impact, through addressing the sense of injustice felt by those who believe that they suffer costs of conservation (HWC), get little or no benefit, and that no-one seems to care. This study confirms the conclusions of previous research at BINP which goes on to conclude that a sense of injustice is an important driver of illegal activities such as poaching in many PAs (see Table 7) (Twinamatsiko 2015).

Table 7: Motivations of unauthorised resource use (URU)

Motivations for URU	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
None	2	0.4	0.35
Culture	37	6.6	6.9
Poverty	227	40.2	47.08
Income	66	11.7	58.76
Unfairness	201	35.6	94.34
Peer norms	28	5.0	99.29
Others	4	0.7	100
Total	565	100	

Source: Reproduced from Twinamatsiko (2015)

All of the above makes the case for enhancing the influence of members of PA-adjacent villages in decision making on what a RS scheme will fund and who should be the primary beneficiaries, so that choices better reflect the value of the benefit as seen by the beneficiaries themselves and the diversity of perspectives within the community. This may require a combination of structural change to the decision-making process to make sure that higher levels (in this case sub-county level) do not second guess the priorities coming from village level other than on strictly technical grounds. It will also require measures to increase awareness and understanding of relevant policy and guidelines from top to bottom, with a process that goes beyond passive dissemination of information to empower the lowest level to engage more in the decision-making process.

Understanding of equitable revenue sharing

How do community members, park managers and local government intermediaries in the RS process understand equitable conservation and equitable RS and to what extent are different types of RS projects contributing to improving equity in conservation?

Equity in distribution

Participants in the focus groups were asked: *how do community members, park managers and local government intermediaries in the RS process understand equitable conservation and equitable RS and to what extent are different types of RS projects contributing to improving equity in conservation?* Three focus groups proposed that funds should be shared equally between everyone in target communities. Four focus groups noted that

equitable RS could be best achieved by investing in common good projects, which by their nature benefit all, though not necessarily equally (eg a road repair will benefit those who use the road more). Two focus groups concluded that poorer, more needy, people should benefit more than richer people but one of these groups went on to clarify that they meant 'relatively more than currently' and by this meant that the elite capture that exists should be stopped so that all benefit equally.

Several focus groups and participants in the stakeholder workshop also raised issues around what proportion of tourism revenue is shared with the community and proposed that it would be more transparent to express this as a per cent of total tourism revenue rather than, as now, as per cent of gate receipts plus a fixed levy on gorilla tracking permits.

Notable by its absence from most of the focus group discussions on the meaning of equitable RS was the notion that benefits from RS should be targeted on people who experience the negative impacts of crop raiding as a form of compensation. It is known that relatively few people are aware that this is a key principle of the RS policy and guidelines, but even so one might expect more people to make the link between the allocation of benefits and costs of conservation. This may partially reflect the fact that the current RS guidelines have only one minor reference to equity. Given the importance of equity both from a moral and instrumental perspective, and growing attention to equity in national and international policy, this seems like a serious omission (Schreckenber *et al.* 2016).

Equity in procedure and recognition

Four focus groups focused more on equity in procedures, proposing that the key issue is that communities at village level should get to decide what projects are funded, and that government officers at higher levels should not alter their

priorities. One focus group specifically noted that the voice of women is not heard, which they attribute to lack of capacity and empowerment. The Batwa focus group also talked of equity in procedure (that people should listen to and take account of their views) and this was the only focus group to raise issues of recognition saying that the RS scheme should treat the Batwa with respect, including recognising their unique identity and values. Several groups also raised issues of transparency – both in relation to how much money the PA generates and how much they should receive, and in terms of tendering processes.

"As women, our ideas are not always heard in meetings."

A female participant in Nyamabale parish, April 2016

Other measures proposed to enhance procedural equity include:

- Timely release of funds
- Stronger monitoring of all aspects of the scheme including funding flow
- Translation of RS guidelines into local language
- Generating more evidence of the real costs of crop raiding
- More active dissemination of key information eg use of public notice boards, village health volunteers, and
- Establishing a proposer complaints mechanism.

Learning with wider relevance

This learning evaluation study at BINP has generated examples of equity issues in each of the three key dimensions of equity – recognition, procedure and distribution. Given that discourse around RS tends to focus on who gets what benefit, it is notable that issues of recognition and procedure were raised as equity issues without prompting. There is a growing body of research from conservation and PES that emphasises the importance of recognition and procedure, not just as a means to determine what constitutes equitable sharing of benefits but as an end – to the extent that they foster self-esteem and a sense of inclusion in society that contributes to human wellbeing (Martin *et al.* 2016).

Within the distributive dimension of equity the study also reveals the diversity of interpretations of what constitutes equitable distribution of benefits that is common in both RS and PES. In this case some proposed that benefits should be equally shared while others said that addressing the needs of poorer community members should be the priority (often described as a ‘pro-poor’ approach). Referring back to Table 4, notably absent in the focus group discussions was any reference to the other two common interpretations of equitable benefit sharing – that targeting of the benefits from RS should reflect costs incurred or contribution to conservation (which can also be seen as a form of cost). This delinking of benefits and costs may partly reflect the fact that RS policy in Uganda has never had the references to equity that are now common with benefit-sharing schemes, which would normally stimulate some discussion of benefits as a form of compensation for costs. While benefit-sharing schemes in conservation and PES worldwide increasingly aspire to being equitable, a lack of clarity on how equity is interpreted remains a common problem (Schreckenber *et al.* 2016; McDermott *et al.* 2013).

Trade-offs between more equitable and more effective conservation

What are the likely trade-offs between potential measures to deliver more effective conservation and more equitable conservation including trade-offs between different notions of equity?

As noted in Section 1, equity is a condition that defines how PA conservation/RS should be practiced, and effectiveness is about specific goals/targets that will be achieved along the way. Since goals/targets and the context change over time there is no equitable and effective end state, ie the terms should be used in the sense of achieving *more* equitable and *more* effective conservation (Schreckenberg *et al.* 2016). Equity and effectiveness are very clearly interrelated and there are synergies both in terms of the contribution that more equitable conservation makes to improving the effectiveness of conservation and vice versa.

A trade-off is a compromise between two desirable but to some extent incompatible objectives, that is achieving more of objective A means achieving less of objective B. Objectives and thus trade-offs may exist and be managed at output, outcome or impact levels, but the focus will usually be how a trade-off plays out at impact level ie in terms of conservation of biodiversity and human wellbeing.

There are also trade-offs between effectiveness and equity in that stronger application of equity principles will affect the level and balance of achievement, in terms of biodiversity conservation and social objectives at site, national and global levels. Furthermore there are often trade-offs within effectiveness (eg between national and global goals) and within equity (see below). Under this learning question the intention was to identify some of the more significant trade-offs in the context of BINP that need to be carefully managed by the stakeholders who have the power and authority to do so.

Mitigation of HWC vs increasing support vs wellbeing benefits

At the end of each focus group the participants discussed to what extent they felt that RS contributes to four objectives:

1. Contributing to wellbeing through tangible benefits
2. Improving people-PA relations
3. Increasing local support for conservation (eg helping UWA put out fires), and
4. Mitigation of HWC (eg through planting Mauritius thorn fences).

Typically, respondents in the focus groups were positive that RS is enhancing community relationships with the PA. This is associated with the community projects funded by RS (noted by 21 focus groups), and specifically support to pay school fees. Other community projects, however, such as the provision of goats to provide an alternative livelihood, were described negatively as of low quality (six focus groups); there were also criticisms that few families benefit from community projects (four focus groups) and that they are unequally distributed (two focus groups).

There is a clear trade-off between objectives 1 and 4 above, in so far as more funds allocated to HWC (crop raiding) means less for projects that contribute to wellbeing of village members as a whole. Crop raiding was reported as a key trade-off for RS encouraging support for conservation (reported in nine focus groups) and also in undermining the economic value of the PA and efforts to enhance community relationships (seven focus groups).

Pathways to impact

To what extent do the six different impact pathways identified in the theory of change (and/or other pathways) contribute to conservation impact?

Figure 13 shows the six impact pathways with arrows adjusted in width according to the importance of each of the six pathways as indicated in Figure 10. The width of the other arrows can then be calculated, except for the three dotted arrows on the right hand side where there is uncertainty over what proportion of increased community support translates into support for conservation via community members reducing illegal activities versus via other conservation-supportive behaviours.


When interpreting this analysis it must be borne in mind that participants in the survey scored the six different pathways according to their knowledge and experience of them to date, not their assessment of their potential. On this basis it can be tentatively concluded that:

- Delivering benefits is believed to have had more conservation impact than measures to reduce cost (ie addressing human-wildlife conflict).
- Enhancing recognition and procedural equity are considered important factors (ie the conservation impact of RS is not just related to the volume and allocation of benefits).
- The alternative livelihood pathway is considered insignificant by conservation agencies and local government. This suggests that although delivering livelihood benefits has conservation value, it is doubtful that this works to reduce unauthorised use of park resources by providing local people with alternative sources of income or substitutes for park resources. This is not surprising given the evidence that has been accumulating from conservation practice beyond RS of the failure of alternative

livelihood strategies to deliver conservation impact (Roe *et al.* 2015; Wicander and Coad 2015).

- Operating the RS scheme through local government is not considered to generate significant conservation value in terms of increased local government support for conservation. This may partly reflect the fact that many local government staff do not yet appear to have taken on board the conservation objectives of RS.

Figure 13: Validated theory of change shows the six impact pathways with arrows adjusted in width according to the importance of each. Note: Dotted lines indicate that the relative importance is unknown.



5

Conclusion and recommendations

Although this learning evaluation identifies many weaknesses in both the policy and practice of RS at BINP, it is important to keep in mind that even with these weaknesses the scheme has undoubtedly made a major contribution to conservation of BINP since it started in 1996.

There can be little doubt that transferring management of the RS scheme to local government has led to some reduction in efficiency from the conservation perspective (less conservation impact per unit of RS funds). This has been due to the increases in transaction costs and leakage and wastage and reduced accountability which are inevitable when there are more links in the chain. On the other hand, having the scheme managed by local government may well have created synergies with local government efforts that did not exist before, and thereby contribute to more effective and more sustainable development.

The purpose of this learning evaluation however is not to draw conclusions on the performance of RS, but to capture learning that can help improve the scheme – and there is very clearly great potential to do so. Some broad recommendations for improvement include:

1. **Streamline management systems** to reduce transaction costs and strengthen accountability while ensuring governance reflects the specific goals and principles of revenue sharing. An incremental approach would be to reduce the number of levels of local government engaged in the revenue-sharing scheme to just the sub-county level. A more radical approach would be to transfer management to a non-governmental or private sector organisation.

2. **Clarify the relative weighting given to human-wildlife conflict versus human wellbeing.** This needs to be done in the national policy at the level of key principles relating to the intended goals of revenue sharing, but the actual weighting could vary from one PA to another according to context.
3. **Increase accountability of the revenue sharing scheme to key actors** that have strongest interest in its effective implementation, in this case UWA and PA-adjacent communities.
4. **Strengthen monitoring and reporting** on how decisions are made, the level of funding and its flow through the system, and how key actors perform their responsibilities.
5. **Maximise the value of benefits and cost reduction in terms of human wellbeing.** The key parameter is not the financial value of a revenue-sharing intervention but its contribution to wellbeing – not an argument for more sophisticated valuation of benefits and cost but rather for this final point.
6. **Strengthen the influence of the target communities,** and key social groups within them, on the selection of projects and beneficiaries through change in governance structures and processes.

A recurring theme throughout this report is the importance of equity. This is increasingly recognised in all types of benefit-sharing mechanisms associated with conservation. Growing attention to equity in conservation and conservation-related schemes, such as RS, reflects both a moral argument and the instrumental argument that fairer conservation is likely to be ultimately more effective and sustainable (Schreckenber *et al.* 2016). This study strongly supports the conclusion that attention to equity should be an issue of recognition and procedure as much as it is an issue of the distribution of benefits and costs. Arguably this is particularly so with problems such as HWC, that have few simple solutions, and where a collaborative learning approach is crucial.

Although this study has focused on just one PA in Uganda, the six points listed above and many other more specific points within the body of this report will have relevance to RS schemes in other PAs within Uganda and beyond Uganda. This study has focused on a particular type of benefit-sharing scheme where there is no explicit conditionality linking benefits and specific conservation-friendly actions of the beneficiaries. However, some of the learning will also be applicable to forms of benefit sharing and payments for ecosystem services that, at least in theory, have much stronger conditionality.

Acronyms

BINP	Bwindi Impenetrable National Park
BMCT	Bwindi and Mgahinga Conservation Trust
HWC	Human-wildlife conflict
ICD	Integrated conservation and development
ITFC	The Institute of Tropical Forest Conservation
LC	Local council (LC1 village, LC2 parish, LC3 sub-county, LC4 county, LC5 district)
MUST	Mbarara University of Science and Technology
PA	Protected area
PES	Payment for ecosystem services
RS	Revenue sharing
UWA	Uganda Wildlife Authority

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Knowledge
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For the past 20 years a revenue-sharing scheme has been in place for communities surrounding Bwindi Impenetrable National Park, Uganda. This learning evaluation looks at how revenue sharing might become more effective and more equitable. Using three dimensions of equity – recognition, procedure and distribution – the research explores funding flows, beneficiary targeting, monitoring and reporting, governance structures, project type and selection processes, understanding of equity, trade-offs between equity and effectiveness, and the pathways to conservation impact. Although this study focuses on one specific protected area in Uganda, many of the findings are relevant to revenue-sharing schemes in other protected areas within Uganda and beyond.

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