Isomorphic Forces and Tax Compliance in Developing Countries: A Systematic Review

dc.contributor.authorNaster Tumwebembeire
dc.contributor.authorNixon Kamukama
dc.contributor.authorNsambu Kijjambu Frederick
dc.contributor.authorJohn Kule Baguma
dc.date.accessioned2026-02-04T10:03:13Z
dc.date.issued2026-01-16
dc.description.abstractIntroduction: Tax compliance is a critical determinant of revenue mobilisation, especially in developing countries where governments face persistent challenges of informality, weak institutions, and low taxpayer morale. While coercive, normative, and mimetic forces have been theorised to shape compliance through neo-institutional perspectives, the extent and nature of their influence remain fragmented across contexts and methods. This systematic review synthesises empirical evidence on how isomorphic forces affect tax compliance. Methods: The review followed the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA 2020) framework. Searches were conducted across Scopus, Web of Science, Google Scholar, and ProQuest, supplemented with citation chaining. Inclusion criteria restricted the corpus to peer-reviewed empirical studies published in English between 2016 and 2025 that explicitly operationalised coercive, normative, or mimetic forces in relation to tax compliance. Fifty eligible studies were identified from an initial pool of 208 records. Data were extracted into structured matrices and synthesised thematically. Results: The findings reveal that coercive forces generally improve compliance, but their effects are fragile if applied in isolation and may backfire in high-trust contexts. Normative forces consistently foster voluntary compliance and often outperform coercion in sustaining long-term adherence. Mimetic forces, though underexplored, appear significant in digital and uncertain environments, where peer imitation and benchmarking strongly influence tax compliance behaviours. Crosscutting evidence highlights that trust and coercion are complementary, compliance outcomes vary between filing and payment, and cultural and institutional settings condition the relative weight of different pressures. Conclusion: The review affirms the explanatory power of neo-institutional theory and extends the Slippery Slope Framework by demonstrating the interplay of coercive, normative, and mimetic influences. Policy implications point to the need for balancing enforcement with legitimacy-building, socialisation, and system design that makes compliance visible and easy to emulate. Key research gaps include the under-theorisation of mimetic mechanisms, the dominance of cross-sectional designs, and insufficient differentiation between compliance outcomes. Future studies should employ longitudinal approaches, develop clearer measures of peer influence, and investigate digital taxation as a new frontier for shaping taxpayer behaviour.
dc.identifier.citationTumwebembeire, N., Kamukama, N., Frederick, N. K. & Baguma, J. K. (2026). Isomorphic Forces and Tax Compliance in Developing Countries: A Systematic Review. International Journal of Finance and Accounting, 5(1), 47-65.
dc.identifier.urihttps://ir.must.ac.ug/handle/123456789/4212
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherInternational Journal of Finance and Accounting
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 United Statesen
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/us/
dc.subjectIsomorphic forces
dc.subjectCoercive power
dc.subjectNormative pressures
dc.subjectMimetic pressures
dc.subjectTax compliance
dc.subjectNeo-institutional theory
dc.subjectDeveloping countries
dc.subjectSystematic review.
dc.titleIsomorphic Forces and Tax Compliance in Developing Countries: A Systematic Review
dc.typeArticle

Files

Original bundle

Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Loading...
Thumbnail Image
Name:
Isomorphic Forces and Tax Compliance in Developing Countries- a Systematic Review.pdf
Size:
446.2 KB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format

License bundle

Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Loading...
Thumbnail Image
Name:
license.txt
Size:
1.71 KB
Format:
Item-specific license agreed upon to submission
Description: